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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Appellate jurisdiction to decide this appeal is granted to the
Utah

Supreme

Court

1953, as amended)•

under

authority

of

U.C.A.

78-2-2(3)(i)

(ch.

Defendant/Appellant was convicted by the State

of Utah in the First Judicial District Court, Box Elder County with
murder in the second degree, a felony of the first degree; aggravated assault, a felony of the third degree; and threatening or using
a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, a class B misdemeanor.
The

jury verdict

of guilty was pronounced

Sentence was pronounced

on February

on January

26, 1990.

21, 1990, and the Appellant

filed a Motion for New Trial on March 2, 1990, together with an
Affidavit (R352).
March 23, 1990.

A hearing on the Motion for New Trial was held
Thereafter on May 4, 1990, Judge Gunnell denied

the Motion for New Trial, and Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal
on May 31, 1990, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 4(b).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW FOR EACH ISSUE WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY

1.

Was

Fourteenth

Appellant

Amendment

denied

his

constitutional

United
right

States
and

State

Sixth
of

and
Utah

constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, a fair
trial, due process, and equal protection as a result of the following acts of the Trial Court:
a.

initially

refusing
-6-

to appoint, and

then

belatedly

appointing a private investigator to assist Appellant's

trial

counsel in pretrial investigation and preparation?
b.

denying a Motion for Continuance and direct denial

of Appellant's Motion to Appoint Psychological and Expert Personnel
and Motion to Allow Psychological Testing and Mental Evaluation for
the purpose of establishing by expert testimony that the Appellant
could not and did not form the intent to commit second degree
murder due to voluntary intoxication?
c.

denying Appellant's Motion for the Jury to View the

Scene of the Crime?
d.

requiring the jury to sit all day in the jury room

while waiting for the jury instructions to be prepared?
The standard of review in regard to these issues are both
constitutional law, see Ake vs, Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 105
S. Ct. 1087, 1092-98, and whether the Court abused its discretion.
State vs. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P. 2d 74, (UT 1945).
2.

Did the following acts of the Box Elder County Attorney

constitute reversible error either through improper statements made
individually

or cumulatively, and did

the Trial Court

commit

reversible error by denying Appellant's Motion for a Mistrial based
upon the acts set forth in subparagraphs a. through d. below:
a.

Allowing perjured testimony of Richard Anderson, an

eye-witness, to be used at trial;
b.

By discounting Defendant's claim of self-defense, by

remarking that it was made up and rehearsed;
c.

Failure to produce the so-called weapon (sharpening

stone) used in the aggravated assault against Eddie Apodaca.
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d.

Vouching

the State of Utah's key
The standard
statements

of

for the credibility

Anderson,

eyewitness.

review

or actions

of Richard

in regard

is whether

to improper

prosecutorial

the prosecutor's

remarks or

actions brought to the attention of the jurors matters that they
would not be justified
and

if so, whether

in considering

there

in reaching their verdict,

is a reasonable

likelihood

that the

misconduct so prejudiced the jury that a favorable result for the
Defendant would have occurred.
(UT

1988).

warranted

State vs. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190

Ruling on whether the conduct of the prosecution

a mistrial

will

not be overturned

absent

an abuse of

discretion.
3.
with

Did Appellant's trial counsel fail to provide Appellant

effective

assistance

of counsel

as required

by

the United

States Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution?

In

order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the Appellant
must

show;

(1) that the Appellant's

trial counsel

rendered a

deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that a
reasonable

probability

exists

that

except

for

ineffective

assistance of counsel, the result would have been different.
vs. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (UT 1985).

State

In other words, was the

Appellant prejudiced by his counsels performance to such an extent
that the trial cannot be relied upon as producing a just result?
4.

Did the Court unfairly deny Appellant's Motion for a New

Trial by failing to consider the testimony of 3 Co-Defendants, (who
are eyewitnesses

that testified

in later

separate

trial, but

refused to testify in Appellant's trial by exercising their Fifth

-8-

Amendment

rights

exonerating

against

statements?

self-incrimination)
The

standard of

Trial Court abused its discretion.

in light

review

of

their

is whether

the

State vs> Harris, 513 P.2d 438

(UT 1973)•
5.
and

Was Appellant denied a fair trial because the Jury, Court

Criminal

System was prejudiced

towards

him?

Appellant has

personally requested to counsel that these matters be presented to
the Court, but has no supporting authority.
6.

Was there cumulative error made in this case, sufficient

to warrant a reversal of Appellant's conviction?

Cumulative error

exists if the cumulative impact of substantial errors prejudiced
Appellant's right to a fair trial.

See State vs. Rammel, 721 P.2d

498, 501-02 (UT 1986).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION
IS DETERMINATIVE
The interpretation of the following constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules is determinative of the issues stated:
Point 1:

Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution
Article I, Section 12
Constitution of Utah
U.C.A. 77-32-1(3)
U.C.A. 76-5-203(1)
U.C.A. 77-14-3

Point 2:

Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution

Point 3:

Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution
U.C.A. 77-14-3

Point 4:

Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution
U. C. A. 77-14-3
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Point 5:

Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution

Point 6:

Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Criminal Information filed against Appellant in the First
Circuit Court of Box Elder County, Utahf
and

three

Co-Defendants, Don

(R-4) charged Appellant

Brown, William

Cummins, and

Billy

Cayer, with committing the crime of murder in the second degree, a
felony of the first degree, on the night of October 25, 1989, in
violation

of

U.C.A.

76-5-203

(1953

As Amended), ' Additionally,

Appellant alone was charged with two separate counts of aggravated
assault, each a third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 76-4-203
(1953 As Amended). (R-4) Allegedly all four defendants jointly and
in concert caused the death of Miguel (Mike) Ramirez resulting from
numerous

blows

from

the defendant's

feet, hands, and

a wrench,

wielded solely by Appellant, during a fight that occurred outside
of the trailer houses where the Defendants were employed.

All of

the Defendants, as well as the State's three eyewitnesses to the
alleged crime, Richard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Eddie Apodaca,
resided in a small trailer camp consisting of four trailers parked
on a remote piece of land located on the Northwest shore of the
Great Salt Lake.

The trailers were owned by Western Brine Shrimp

Company, which employed all of the Defendants and eyewitnesses.
The evidence was that the night of October 25, 1989 was dark,
cloudy, and a moonless night; the only outside lighting for tens of
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years to life, with all counts to run concurrently,

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

According
State's

to the testimony

of Eddie Apodaca, one of the

three eyewitnesses, that on the evening

of October 25,

1989, the Appellant, along with eight other employees of Western
Brine Shrimp Company, were present and residing

in three trailer

houses located on the company's property on the northwest side of
the Great Salt Lake. [T19-20]

Of the nine crew members, Richard

Anderson and Eric Tilley, the State's other eyewitnesses, and
Sherman

Gallardo

resided

Appellant, and Miguel

in Trailer

#1.[T19,33]

Eddie Apodaca,

(Mike) Ramirez, the victim, resided

trailer #2, up until the night of the incident. [T19,20,33]

in

Billy

Cayer, Don Brown, and William Cummins resided in trailer #3.

At

approximately

#2

9:45

p.m.,

William

Cummins

went

to

trailer

[T19-20; 534] and asked Eddie Apodaca to come over to trailer #3.
[T20]

When Eddie Apodaca

entered

trailer

#3, the residents of

trailer #3 as well as Appellant were present

[T20], who had taken

some of his items to trailer #3, were drinking whiskey and vodka.
[T31]

In a friendly manner, Eddie Apodaca took a drink. [T32]

Don

Brown accused Eddie Apodaca of acting like he was the foreman of
the

crew.

Appellant

also expressed

his displeasure with

Eddie

Apodaca for failing to help Appellant with some work. [T21]
this

point

materially
below.

in

time,

Eddie

Apodaca's

story

begins

to

At

differ

from the Appellant's testimony, which is set forth

Eddie's story was that he was struck in the back of the
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miles around the camp were the dim lights coming from the trailers
themselves.
On that night of October 25, sometime between 9:00 p.m. and
midnight, Appellant
were sitting

and

Co-Defendants

in a trailer consuming

Cummins, Brown, and

alcoholic beverages.

Cayer
Eddie

Apodaca, a worker at the camp, came to the trailer and an argument
started

between Appellant

struck Apodaca.
started

and Apodaca, and

thereafter, Appellant

Apodaca got up and returned

to his trailer and

to dress while explaining what had happened to his room-

mate, Mike Ramirez.

Thereafter Brown, Cummins, Cayer and Appellant

entered Apodaca and Ramirez's trailer.

Subsequently, another fight

ensued, knives were drawn, and Mike left the trailer.

Cummins,

Brown, and Appellant were all among the three or four people, other
than the victim, that participated in the latter part of the fight
that occurred outside the trailers, when the fight escalated and
weapons were used.

Eventually, the fight ended, but the next

morning, near five o'clock, Ramirez died of multiple blunt trauma
injury.
Appellant properly

raised

the following

defenses: voluntary

intoxication as precluding him from forming the requisite intent
for a second degree murder; self-defense because the victim wielded
a

knife; and either non-participation

in or withdrawal

fight that occurred after Appellant had defended
Ramirez outside the trailers.

from the

himself from

After a separate jury trial lasting

five days, the Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder,
aggravated assault, and threatening or using a dangerous weapon in
a fight or quarrel and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five
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head

with a sharpening

stone by Appellant.

[T21]

struggle, Eddie ran back to his trailer. [T22]

Then after a

Shortly thereafter,

defendants Don Brown, William Cummins, Billy Cayer, and Appellant
all

entered

trailer #2 at approximately

the same time. [T22]

Appellant was seen holding nunchunks. [T23]
between Eddie Apodaca and the four men. [T23]

Mike Ramirez jumped
Cummins stated they

should get a knife in Mike Ramirez's pocket. [T23]
Ramirez and Don Brown pulled out knives. [T24]

Then, both Mike

After Mike Ramirez

dropped his knife, he was pulled out of trailer #2. [T24]

Billy

Cayer remained with Eddie Apodaca in trailer #2. [T25]
Billy Cayer, who was drunk, tried to hit Eddie Apodaca several
times. [T25]

A few minutes later Don Brown came back into trailer

#2 and told Billy Cayer to leave Eddie Apodaca alone, and to gather
his things and leave camp. [T26]
As Eddie Apodaca exited trailer #2 and ran between trailers #1
and #2 [T26], he saw Mike Ramirez lying on the ground
kicked by a blur of people standing around him.

[T54] being

William Cummins

then asked Eddie Apodaca if he was going to help his buddy just
prior to striking Eddie Apodaca and knocking him down behind the
trailers. [T26]
As soon as Eddie Apodaca returned to his feet, Appellant came
at him with a wrench in his hand. [T27]
running

to the north

Eddie Apodaca took off

[T26] , ran into bags of brine shrimp eggs

[T56,526], and then heard William Cummins say "leave him alone",
"let him go", "let's

finish

this guy", or something

like that.

Eddie Apodaca did not know whether anyone was following him because
it was pretty dark.

After running about 60 feet, Eddie Apodaca
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looked back between the trailers and saw a blur of more than one
person standing around Mike Ramirez. [T56-57]
According

to

the

testimony

of

Richard

Anderson,

another

eyewitness, he was awakened by a commotion around 10:30 p.m. [T64]
Eric Tilley's testimony was that he was the first person to get up
in

trailer

#1 and

rousted Anderson out of bed.

[T150]

Richard

Anderson stated, "let's not get involved", [T152] and consequently
Richard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and their roommate Sherman Gallardo
waited a couple of minutes before Sherman Gallardo opened the door
to their trailer to look outside. [T152]

However, Richard Anderson

testified that as soon as he heard the sounds outside his trailer,
he looked out to see what was happening. [T64,88]
Prior to the time the door was opened, Richard Anderson heard
an unidentifiable voice say, "leave this camp before we kill you".
[T82]

Eric Tilley and Richard Anderson then followed

Sherman

Gallardo and looked out the door after Sherman Gallardo, who said
something
Sherman

to the people outside.

Gallardo

said,

"cool

Eric Tilley

it, Don", and

testified

immediately

that

someone

turned and responded with a threat that, "if you don't want some of
this, stay inside".

[T152]

Richard Anderson testified that when

the door was first opened, Don Brown swung a crescent wrench at
Richard Anderson and asked him if he wanted some of this.
But Appellant
person
Anderson

in contradiction testified

that he was the only

who held the crescent wrench that night. [T655]
testified

fight;

[T88]

Richard

Anderson's

that

the door

remained

[T67]

opened

Richard

throughout

the

Eric Tilley, however, in a sharp contradiction to
testimony

testified
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that the door was

closed

after Sherman Gallardo was threatened, and was reopened by Richard
Anderson only after a period of five to ten minutes, and was generally shut. [T154]
When Richard Anderson first looked out the door, he allegedly
saw Don Brown, William Cummins, Billy Cayer and the Appellant
kicking and beating Mike Ramirez. [T66]

However, Eric Tilley, who

was standing in front of Richard Anderson, testified that he saw
only three people standing around one person lying on the ground
and that those three people were Appellant, Billy Cayer, and either
Don

Brown or William Cummins, [T153] who look alike, since they

possess the same build and color of hair.
Richard Anderson, in contradiction to Eric Tilley's testimony
stated that he was able to see the persons and events by virtue of
light emanating from the open doors of trailers #1. [T75-76, 108]
Eric

Tilley testified

that only one dim stove light was on in

trailer #1. [T172]
Richard Anderson testified that he did not see all of the rest
of the fight because Sherman Gallardo and he took turns looking out
the door. [T81, 104]

Richard Anderson also testified that William

Cummins did most of the beating during the times he was watching.
[T551]

The fight gradually moved from the front of trailer #2 to

behind the amphibian parked in front of trailer #1. [T101]

Richard

Anderson

Ramirez

testified

he

saw William

[T72] and saw him hitting him
vehicle.

Cummins

choking

Mike

in the face behind the amphibian

He also saw Appellant hit Mike Ramirez several times with

a wrench,[T73] prepare to stab Mike Ramirez with a knife, and then
swung the knife at Sherman Gallardo when he said "you don't want to
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do that, man". [T67-69]
Throughout the fight Richard Anderson testified that he considered Don Brown, William Cummins, Billy Cayer, and the Appellant,
who were all pretty drunk, to be dangerous, because he didn't know
just what they would do. [T175]
Although the fight lasted approximately 45 minutes, according
to Anderson, all three of the occupants and witnesses of trailer #1
were military veterans armed with knifes and a large two-by-four,
yet paradoxically, and to their shame no one in trailer #1 assisted
Mike

Ramirez.

[T115-117]

Richard

Anderson

testified

he

thought

that the end result of the fight would be a beating, namely, that
Mike Ramirez would be able to take care of himself and there would
be no problem.

[T560]

The time discrepancy of the time the fight lasted forty-five
minutes to an hour, with the testimony of Richard Anderson, [T85]
was highlighted when Eric Tilley testified it lasted no more than
15-20 minutes, [T173] and Mike Ramirez then got up, went into his
trailer and washed
Anderson

himself off.

stated he saw Cummins

Later around midnight, Richard
sitting on the amphibian.

[T175]

Thereafter, at about twenty-minutes later, Don Brown came over to
trailer

#1 to ask the occupants

if they had seen anything, and

Richard Anderson said "no" [T74] in contradiction to his own testimony that he did not do anything to make the Defendants think that
he was asleep. [T99]
Around 5:00 a.m., Richard Anderson heard a knock on the door
of trailer #1. [T77]

When Richard Anderson and Sherman Gallardo

opened the door, Mike Rameriz was seen sitting on the pallet out-
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side the door.

He asked them to call 911; told them he couldn't

breath, and asked for a drink of water.

After drinking some water,

Mike Ramirez collapsed and died. [T77]
Appellant, who testified at trial, presented a wholly different version of what happened.
While Eddie Apodaca was in trailer #3, Eddie Apodaca started a
fight and then left for his trailer.

[T633]

After Eddie Apodaca

went back to trailer #2, Billy Cayer left trailer #3, followed by
William Cummins and Don Brown.

[T640]

Shortly, thereafter, the

Appellant went looking for the others and found them in trailer #2
along with Eddie Apodaca and Mike Ramirez.

[T641]

After the

Appellant entered the open door of trailer #2, he testified that
Mike Ramirez had pulled out a knife and had stabbed Billy Cayer.
[T642]

Appellant then tried to find some nunchukas[T643) in the

closet but was hampered by the close quarters.

Once Appellant got

out the nunchukas, Billy grabbed the nunchukas from Appellant and
threw them towards the trailer door. [T644]

The Appellant then

left the trailer by himself. [T644-645]
Appellant was looking back in the trailer, and suddenly Mike
Rameriz came out the trailer door and started to attack the
Appellant. [T646-647]

Rameriz kicked the Appellant, and Appellant

fell backwards into a barrel.

Appellant grabbed a crescent wrench

off the barrel, and told Rameriz "Don't".

Rameriz swung twice at

the Appellant, when Appellant kicked Ramirez. [T647-648]

But

Rameriz would not stop coming with the knife so Appellant hit
Rameriz with the wrench. [T648]

The two struggled, and Appellant

could only stop Rameriz with the wrench. [T651]
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Eventually, some

other

person

pulled

Appellant

and

Rameriz

apart,

Appellant was still concerned about the knife.

[T652]

but

Appellant then

kicked the knife out of Rameriz's hand, and Rameriz then said he
had had enough. [T653]
Appellant then went back into trailer #3, [654-655] had
another drink and thereafter either passed out or fell asleep, and
did not come to until morning, after Rameriz had died. [T655-656]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court violated Appellant's constitutional right to a
fair trial and committed reversible error in effectively denying
the indigent Appellant the right to prepare an adequate defense,
namely by not timely appointing to the defendant the assistance of
a private investigator and a court appointed psychiatrist.

The

need for psychiatric evaluation was crucial in light of the
Appellant's severe intoxication, and particularly where the State
of Utah placed Appellant's mental state at issue by charging him
with second degree murder.
Appellant's trial counsel made a timely objection to the trial
date set by the District Court Judge; gave necessary notice for a
Motion For Continuance, and made a reasonable effort to have the
trial date rescheduled for good cause.
Motion

For

Appellant's

Continuance
defense

of

the

counsel's

trial

ability

The denial of Appellant's
date
to

severely

impaired

adequately

prepare,

especially for cross-examination of the State's eyewitnesses based
upon their numerous prior and contemporary conflicting statements.
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Consequently, the trial court violated Appellant's United States
Sixth Amendment constitution right to effective assistance of
counsel and abused its discretion in denying a trial continuance to
allow counsel adequate time to prepare,

POINT I

THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,
A FAIR TRIAL, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION BY
VARIOUS REVERSIBLE ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
INCLUDING THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO CONTINUE
Appellant asserts that the facts of this case affirmatively
demonstrate that the Appellant did not receive effective assistance
of counsel, a fair trial, due process of law, or equal protection
under the law in violation of his United States Constitutional
guarantees of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment and State of Utah
constitutional right as guaranteed by Article I Section 12 by the
arbitrary

denials

of

various

motions

made

by

the

Defendant,

on

the

fact

especially including motions for continuance.
Appellant

places

this

claim

squarely

that

throughout the trial, denials of motions for continuance placed the
Defendant in the position that even on the eve of trial, Defendant
and his counsel told the Court that they were unprepared to proceed
through the trial. [Transcript of Hearing held January 18, 1990,
pages 100-106]

The Defendant had waived his right to a Speedy

Trial [Jan. 18, T27] so as to allow other evidence to be gathered
in support of his defense (inter alia, find the third eye-witness;
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get

expert

testimony

on

the

sound

of

the generator;

further

psychological examination and testimony for the mental state of the
Defendant)

[Jan. 18, T100-106] as well as to allow Counsel to

prepare for trial, which was a concern expressed to the Court prior
to trial. [Jan. 18, T27]
However, the Trial Court chose to ignore Defendant's requests,
thereby hampering Defendant's ability to obtain the necessary
evidence to fairly present his case to the Court, or to properly
prepare for a trial of this magnitude.
Further, Appellant cites as grounds for reversal other denials
of motions by the Court that denied the Appellant his right to a
fair trial.

A.

Belated Appointment of a Private Investigator To Assist

the Appellant
The Trial Court after being requested, initially
appoint, and

then

investigator

to

reluctantly
assist

and

belatedly

Appellant's

trial

refused to

appointed
counsel

a private

in

pretrial

investigation and preparation, thus prejudicing Appellant's right
to

a

fair

trial

and

requiring

reversal

Factually, the prejudice occurred as follows:
Appellant's appointed

his

conviction.

On October 31, 1989,

trial counsel made an oral motion for the

appointment of a private

investigator to assist him

investigation and preparation.
on November 3, 1990.

of

in pretrial

The circuit court denied the motion

(R12-13, 28).

The Appellant filed with the

court a written Motion for Appointment of Private Investigator for
Discovery and preparation of Defendant's cases pursuant to U.C.A.
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77-32-1(3) (Minimum standards provided by County for defense of
indigent defendants.)
an Order appointing

The District Court trial judge did not enter
a private investigator

for Appellant until

January 17, 1990, more than two months after the initial request
for a private investigator and less than six (6) days before the
trial date of February 5, 1990.

[R. 207-208] (Emphasis Added).

U.C.A. 77-32-1(3) statutorily requires each county to provide
indigent

persons

with

the

investigatory

and

other

facilities

necessary to prepare a due process of law defense.

Moreover, an

indigent

the

defendant

has

a

right,

cognizable

by

Federal

Constitution, to the Appointment of an investigator or expert at
State expense to assist in the preparation and presentation of his
defense.

Wharton's Criminal Procedure (12th E.) Sec. 414.

The

State of Utah's duty to provide an indigent with the means for an
appropriate defense stems from a just interplay of the constitutional right to counsel, to a fair trial, and due process of law.
State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966).

See also, Ake v Oklahoma,

470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1092-98.

In the Ake case the

governmental interest in denying the assistance requested to save
some money was not considered substantial in light of the compelling interest of both the state and the individual in a fair trial.
Obviously, the use of a private investigator to perform certain
duties

that the attorney would otherwise have to perform usually

is cost effective for the State of Utah, in that valuable and
costly attorney billable time is not wasted on work that otherwise
a competent investigator would normally do.
Like the Ake case, U.C.A. 77-32-1(3) manifests the value and
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importance

attributed

to providing

indigent defendants

with

assistance requested, namely private investigatory assistance,
least

in the State of Utah.

The

facts of this case

the
at

clearly

demonstrate that a grave risk of a denial of due process of law
existed if such private investigatory assistance was not rendered,
especially where, as here, the criminal charges made were extremely
grave and involved many conflicting versions made by eyewitnesses,
and a factual

issue was raised

in regard to the lighting at the

scene of the crime which affected
perceive who inflicted the beating,

the eyewitnesses ability to
and at what times, and who was

ultimately involved in the fatal outcome.
of

Utah

twenty

notified

Appellant's

or more witnesses

For example, the State

trial counsel

involved.

The

that there would be
various written

and

recorded statements of Don Brown, the State's three key witnesses,
Richard

Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Eddie Apodaca, as well as

another eyewitness, Sherman Gallardo, who disappeared prior to the
preliminary hearing, contained numerous conflicting and different
statements of fact.
taken;

the

Because of the number of witness statements

conflicting

discrepancies

between

factual
the

versions

witnesses'

contained

stories

and

therein;

the

Appellant's

recollection of the events, it was necessary to the preparation of
an adequate defense

that a private

investigator be appointed

to

assist in interviewing the witnesses; to point out inconsistencies
to the witnesses, and attempt to decipher the truth prior to the
preliminary hearing held on December 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd of
1989.

Equally

important was the need to investigate facts of

Defendant's self-defense claims.
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The Utah Supreme Court has rightfully recognized that "the
preliminary hearing is an important step in the criminal process in
that it serves as both a discovery device and a means to preserve
evidence for trial."
1988).

State vs. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1095 (Utah

Once a witness testifies under oath at a preliminary

hearing they are less likely to change their stories if presented
with inconsistencies in their statements, or discrepancies between
their testimony and that of others.

If a preliminary hearing is to

fully and effectively serve its purposes, the Appellant must have
the opportunity to interview witnesses prior thereto, so that
witnesses may take account of discrepancies and inconsistencies
before their testimony is preserved, and as it were cast in stone.
If a private investigator had been appointed by the Circuit
Court Judge and had been available to take pictures of the crime
scene prior to the preliminary hearing, which contradicted the
State's eyewitness, these pictures could have been shown to the
witnesses to facilitate their recollection of exactly who and what
they were able to see or not see from various vantage points. Most
notable,

Richard

Anderson's

testimony

regarding

the

events

occurring in front of either trailer is highly suspect, since
arguably the door would have obstructed his view (whether open or
shut).

The Appellant's defense was also hampered by the lack of

information regarding the background of Mike Ramirez and his
character
transients,

for

violence

that

investigator.

could

and
have

all
been

of

the

key

investigated

witnesses,
by

a

all

private

Without such information, Appellant was severely

restricted in challenging their credibility, or in showing that the
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victim possessed a violent character in support of the Appellant's
contention that he was acting in self-defense.

The problem of the

use and need for a private investigator was evident at the time of
the preliminary hearing and became more acute as the matter neared
the trial date.

A timely motion was made for the appointment of a

private investigator, but the belated appointment had a devastating
effect on the ability of defense counsel to prepare, and to allow
the defendant to prepare his self-defense argument.

Add to that

the denial of Defendant's motion to continue, and there is little
doubt that the interests of justice were not served in this trial.
The foregoing leaves little doubt that both the Appellant's
State and Federal due process of law constitutional right was
violated, requiring this court to reverse his conviction by the
belated appointment, by the Trial Court, of a private investigator
to assist the Appellant in his preparation.
B.

The Denial of a Continuance to Obtain and Denial of

Appellant's Motion

for Psychiatric Assistance Prevented

Crucial

Testimony of Defendant's Intent.
Appellant argues the First Judicial District Court further
violated

the

Constitutional

Appellant's
Amendment

United
guaranteed

States

Sixth

rights

and

and
State

Fourteenth
of

Utah

constitutional rights under Article I Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution by denying the Appellant's Motion to Continue so as to
pursue psychological testing and mental evaluation.

On January 16,

1990, thirteen days after the District Court Arraignment of the
Appellant on January 3, 1990, Appellant filed with the Trial Court
the motion along with a Notice of Intent to Call Psychiatric and
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Other Expert Witnesses and a Notice of Intent to Claim Lack of
Capacity

to

Form

Intent

made

for

the

exclusive

purpose

of

establishing, by expert psychiatric testimony, that the Appellant
was unable to form the necessary intent to commit second degree
murder

because

of

Appellant's

voluntary

intoxication,

[R.184g,

187-188, 189, 191-192].
The Trial Court allowed some of Appellant's multiple motions,
but did not allow a continuance for Appellant's counsel to pursue
such testing or evaluation.

In so ruling, the Trial Court

committed error since it was a denial of due process of law as
guaranteed

by

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution for the State to deny an indigent defendant the needed
assistance of a psychiatric expert, where as here, the defendant's
mental state at the time of the offense was a substantial factor in
his defense.
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Ake vs. Oklahoma
strongly supports the conclusion that the Trial Court was the
erring party in this trial.

470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 105 S Ct. 1087.

1092-98, 84 L Ed. 2d 53 (1985).
Court held that a state

In Ake the United States Supreme

is required

to provide

an indigent

defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist to support his
insanity defense based, in part, upon the following reasoning:
"The Court has long recognized that when a State
brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent
defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps
to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to
present his defense.
This elementary principle,
grounded
in significant
part
on
the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental
fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot be
equal, where, simply as a result of his poverty, a
-25-

defendant is denied the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his
liberty is at stake • . . To implement this principle,
we have focused on identifying the "basic tools of an
adequate defense or appeal" , and we have required that
such tools be provided to those defendants who cannot
afford to pay for them. . . Three factors are relevant
to this determination.
The first is the private
interest that will be affected by the action of the
State.
The second is the governmental interest that
will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided.
The third is the probable value of the additional or
substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected
interest if those safeguards are not provided.
The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal
proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty
at risk is almost uniquely compelling . . . At the same
time, it is difficult to identify any interest of the
State, other than that in its economy, that weighs
against recognition of this right . . . We therefore
conclude that the governmental interest in denying Ake
the assistance of a psychiatrist is not substantial, in
light of the compelling interest of both the state and
the individual in accurate dispositions".
470 U.S. at 76-79, 105 S. Ct. at 1092-94 (citations
omitted; emphasis added).
The Court then cited to numerous state statutes, including
Utah Code Anno. 77-32-1, and other court decisions which recognized
an indigent defendants right to the assistance of a psychiatrist's
expertise as reflecting:
"[the] reality.. .that when
the State has made the
defendant's
mental
condition
relevant
to
this
criminal
culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the
assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial of the
defendants ability to marshal his defense".
470 U.S. at 80, 105 S. Ct. at 1095.
From these strong judicial pronouncements it is not difficult
to conclude that the Trial Court here violated Appellants Federal
and State constitutional rights to a fair trial, where as here, the
Appellant's state of mind, especially
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in light of a self-defense

argument,

compounded

by

excessive

drinking,

properly evaluated by a psychiatrist.
105 S. Ct. 1087, 1092-98.
(Utah 1981) ("The

should

have

been

See Ake, 470 U.S. 68, 76-87,

C.f., State v Woods, 648 P.2d 71, 88

refusal to grant an indigent defendant's timely

motion for psychiatric assistance in a capital case is an abuse of
discretion... .It is also a denial of due process").
The following mens rea, mental state required

by Utah Code

Ann. Sec. 76-5-203(1) for a conviction of guilty of second degree
murder are stated as:
(1)

intentionally or knowingly causing death of another;

(2)

intending to cause serious bodily injury to another;

(3)

commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of another;

(4)

acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another.

See State v Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 263-65 (Utah 1988).

In this

case, expert psychiatric testimony was crucial to the central issue
of whether the Appellant, due to voluntary intoxication, was unable
to form the requisite intent to commit homicide.
C.f, State v Miller, 677 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1984) (the exclusion of
expert psychiatric testimony on the issue of intent was found to be
reversible error); State v Sessions, 645 P.2d 643,645 (Utah 1982)
("basic rules of evidence pertaining to materiality and relevance
require that a defendant have the right to adduce evidence which
would

tend to disprove the existence of specific intent").
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The

facts in this case do not demonstrate that the Appellant knowingly
and voluntarily waived his due process right to the assistance of a
psychiatric expert.
C•

The Denial of Appellant's Motion for the Jury to View the

Scene,
Discharge of the jury's duty to judge the evidence fairly and
render a considered verdict depended upon the jury's view of the
crime scene.
refused

The request for a jury view, which the trial judge

to allow, further constituted an abuse of the court's

discretion to see that a fair trial had occurred.

The evidence

adduced at trial did not adequately portray the lines of sight and
dim light by which the eyewitnesses were, or were not able to see
the

events.

In that

setting, without

question, sound

judicial

discretion should have granted to the jury the right to view the
scene of the homicide for the purpose of assessing the weight to be
given, in particular, to Richard Anderson's eyewitness testimony in
light of the weighty, conflicting evidence.
The crime took place near midnight in late October in a rural
area.

The only lighting was from dim trailer house lights.

Only

one witness, Richard Anderson, stated Appellant was involved in the
major part of the fight that occurred outside the trailer house.
Richard Anderson's testimony

is inconsistent

in numerous

aspects

with his prior statements, and preliminary hearing testimony and
with the statements and testimony of other witnesses.
sight

His line of

in all probability was also obstructed by door frames and

vehicles.

All this was either pointed out or alluded to when the

oral motion was made [see 1/18 transcript, p. 11 - 13, 17]. With
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the verdict hinging on such inconsistent eyewitness testimony, it
cannot be said that a refusal to permit a jury view of the crime
scene fell within the Trial Court's sound judicial discretion.
Rather,

such

a

crime

scene

view

would

have

contributed

substantially to the presentation of Appellant's defense based on
inadequate

eyewitnesses

identification

of

the

Appellant.

An

appropriate ruling by this Court would be to reverse Appellant's
conviction on the grounds that the Trial Court abused its sound
discretion by not permitting a jury view of the crime scene under
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 17(i) •
D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO SIT ALL DAY

IN THE JURY ROOM WHILE WAITING FOR THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO BE
PREPARED.
Appellant contends that the Trial Court erred when the jury
was allowed to sit in the jury room all day long while the Court,
along with the attorneys prepared the jury instructions.

Appellant

contends that doing so was a denial of a right to a fair trial in
that after four days of testimony, the jury took less than three
hours to conclude it's verdict.

It is Appellant's claim that the

jury could not have reviewed the days of testimony, especially the
conflicting testimony of the State's own witnesses, during such a
short time frame.
There was testimony of Appellant's own self-defense as well as
the testimony
reviewed.

of all the other witnesses that needed to be

The only way, Appellant himself contends, for the jury

to make up it's mind is that they impermissibly decided the case
before the case along with the jury instructions were submitted to

them. [See R 354]

POINT II

THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S MISCONDUCT, INCLUDING
ALLOWING PERJURY, AS WELL AS CONTACT BETWEEN
WITNESSES, CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR
Defendant/Appellant requests that counsel submit to this Court
for

review

four specific

Defendant/Appellant

acts of

claims

are

the prosecuting

actions

that

attorney

warrant

that

reversible

error in this matter:
A.

Allowing perjured testimony of Richard Anderson,
an eye-witness, to be used at trial;

B.

By discounting Defendant's claim of self-defense,
by remarking that it was made up and rehearsed;

C.

Failure to produce the so-called weapon (sharpening
stone) used in the aggravated assault against
Eddie Apodaca.

D.

Vouching for the credibility of a witness.

A. PERJURED TESTIMONY OF RICHARD ANDERSON
One of the eye-witnesses to the events, Richard Anderson,
testified

that he directly

October 25, 1989.

saw what happened

on the evening

of

Yet, testimony of other eye witnesses sharply
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contrasted

with

what

Mr,

Anderson

stated.

[See

Statement

of

Relevant Facts of Issues Presented For Review].
Defendant claims the County Attorney impermissibly:
(1)

allowed Richard Anderson to testify falsely when
it was known that Richard Anderson was not telling
the

truth

because

of

the

inconsistency

of

the

stories as well as the fact that Richard Anderson
could not have seen what he claimed he saw;
(2)

allowed Richard Anderson to change his
testimony, when another eye-witness contradicted
Mr. Anderson as to a key point in- the testimony
after Mr. Anderson was told outside the Courtroom
that

the

other

witness

contradicted

Anderson's

story.

In support of his claim that perjured testimony was allowed,
Defendant

points out that neither Richard

Anderson nor Eddie

Apodaca could see what they claimed to have seen

(inter alia,

people from sixty feet away between two trailers; the happenings
outside trailer #2 or #1 because the door was closed).

As the

Prosecuting Attorney knew or should have known that such testimony
was incorrect, it should not have been used.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the
use

of false or perjured

testimony

by the State to obtain a

conviction, when the State knows that such testimony is false is a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
have

also

held

that

it

is of no consequence
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that

the

They
false

testimony concerned the witness' credibility.
The Supreme Court said in the case of Napue vs. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 31ed 2d 1217, 79 S Ct. 1173 (1959) that,
First, it is established that a conviction obtained
through use of false evidence, known to be such by
representative of the State, must fall under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Mooney vs. Holohan, 294 US 103, 70
L ed 791, 55 S CT 340, 98 ALR 406; Pyle v. Kansas, 317
US 213, 87 L ed 214, 63 S CT 177; Curran v. Delaware
(DA3 Del) 259 F.2d 707. See New York ex rel. Whitman v.
Wilson, 318 US 688, 87 L ed 1083, 63 S Ct 840, and White
v. Ragan, 324 US 760 89 L ed 1348, 65 S Ct 978. Compare
Jones v. Kentucky (CA 6 KY) 97 F2d 335, 338, with Re
Sawyer's Petition (CA7 Wis) 229 F2d 805, 809, Df .
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 US 1, 1 Led 2d 1, 77 S Ct
1, 9. The same result obtains when the State, although
not
soliciting
false
evidence, allows
it
to go
uncorrected when it appears. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 US
28, 2 L ed 2d 9, 78 S Ct 103; United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Dye (AA3 Pa) 221 F2d 763; United States ex
rel. Almeida v. Baldi (CA3 Pa) 195 F2d 815, 33 ALRwd
1407; United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen (DC 111)
86 F Supp 382. See generally annotation, 2 L ed 2d
1575.
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction,
implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease to apply
merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of
the witness.

The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and relia-

bility of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt of
innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible
interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's
life or liberty may depend.

As stated by the New York Court of

Appeals in a case very similar to this one, People v. Savvides, 1
NY2d 554, 557, 154 NYS 2d 885, 887, 136 NE2d 853, 854, 855.
"It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore
upon the witness' credibility rather than directly upon
defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter what its
subject, and if it is any way relevant to the case, the
district attorney has the responsibility and duty to
-32-

correct what he knows to be false and elicit truth . . .
That the district attorney's silence was not the result
of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for
its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial
that could in any real sense be termed fair."
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically addressed the
question of when the police knew of information that the prosecutor
did

not in the case of Barbee v. Warden, Maryland, Penitentiary,

331 F2d 842 (1964).

The Court said,

"Nor is the effect of the nondisclosure neutralized
because the prosecuting attorney was not shown to have
had knowledge of the exculpatory evidence. Failure of
the police to reveal such material evidence in their
possession is equally harmful to a defendant whether the
information is purposely, or negligently, withheld. And
it makes no difference if the withholding
is by
officials other than the prosecutor.
The police are
also a part of the prosecution, and the taint on the
trial is no less if they, rather than the State's
Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure."
The Court went on further to say,

"With respect to the necessity for a showing of
prejudice, the cases sometimes draw a distinction
between the knowing use of false testimony and the
passive nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence.
In the
first type of case the sentence will be set aside
without inquiring into whether the defendant has been
prejudiced, while in the latter some consideration of
the possible effect of the irregularity upon the
fairness of the trial is necessary."
The issue was addressed by this Court in the case of Walker
vs. State 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981) where the Court held that,

"It
is
an
accepted
premise
in
American
Jurisprudence that any conviction obtained by the
knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair
and totally incompatible with rudimentary demands of
justice!
The proposition is firmly established that
conviction obtained through the use of false evidence
known to be such by representatives of the State, must
-33-

fall under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment
and Article
I Section
7, of the Utah
Constitution, if there is any reasonable likelihood that
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of
the jury.
The same result obtains when the State,
although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go
uncorrected when it appears. This standard derives from
both the prosecutorial misconduct and more importantly
the fact that the use of false evidence involved a
corruption of the truth seeking function in the trial
process."
For

his

second

point, Defendant

points

out, Eric

Tilley

testified that Richard Anderson left the trailer to search the only
truck for keys.

Richard Anderson had testified that he had not

left the trailer.
Deputy Dale Ward (who had been identified as a witness) then
contacted
testimony.

Richard

Anderson

to tell him of

the contradiction of

Such contact between witnesses was in violation of the

Court's order of the exclusion of witnesses.

In fact, Mr. Anderson

was told not to discuss the case with other witnesses, [T147] which
would include the Sheriff's Deputy that had sat at trial to assist
the Prosecuting Attorney.
Thereafter, Richard Anderson was recalled to testify regarding
his

leaving

the

trailer

explanation, he changed

to

search

the

truck,

and

without

his story from not going outside his

trailer [T90, 136] to one that he in fact did. [T147]
Defendant maintains

that

the Prosecuting

Attorney

erred

by

allowing Dale Ward to violate the exclusionary rule and using the
testimony after Dale Ward spoke to Richard Anderson,,
The leading Utah cases dealing with prosecutorial misconduct
provide a two-step evaluation process; whether misconduct occurred
and whether the jury is probably influenced by the actions.
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State

v. Troy, 688 P. 2d 483 (UT 1984); State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (UT
1973) .
Certainly step one is evident*

To allow a prosecuting

attorney to circumvent the exclusionary rule is an act that crosses
the boundary wherein discretion is allowed.
shown.

Bad faith need not be

See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1255 (UT 1988).

Regarding step two, clearly the Prosecuting Attorney was so
concerned regarding the contradiction that he asked the the witness
to quash that contradiction when the witness was recalled in
Defendant's main case.

The Defendant's attack on the credibility

of Richard Anderson and the veracity of the story that Richard
Anderson made up was a key point to the defense of Defendant.

It

was always Defendant's contention that Richard Anderson had wanted
to somehow show that he was brave in light of the occurrences that
night; as well as the fact that he molded his testimony to prove
such a point.

By allowing the testimony to come in the way it did

(in violation of the exclusionary rule) it allowed the jury to not
consider the claim of the Defendant that Richard Anderson had made
up part of his story to protect himself from the shame of not
rendering assistance in a situation where he thought help was
needed.
Anderson claimed he was terrified of the happenings, yet it
became known, through another witness, that he had indeed left the
security of the trailer.

Defendant claims that the Prosecuting

Attorney should not have used the testimony of Richard Anderson
after he had been caught in his lie.

That was using perjured

testimony and the Prosecuting Attorney should not have done so at
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all.

B.

ARGUMENTS REGARDING SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM

Defendant

presented

Rameriz were done

testimony

that his actions

in self-defense.

in

The Prosecuting

striking
Attorney

discounted that, and in closing arguments presented more than just
theory, he presented evidence as to how the Prosecutor's theory of
the fabrication of self-defense came about and that the story was
not true or rehearsed.

[T 740, 743, 745, 746, 750]

Even that

evidence was destroyed [T 732, 733] or placed.
The

prosecutor

ethical duty

repeatedly

to refrain

from

violated

improper

the

prosecutorial

remarks made

and

to the jury

panel which were calculated to incite a conviction on references to
the nature of the Defendant's position [a transient, T785] crime as
well as the concocted nature of the Defendant's self-defense.
duty

of

a

Commonwealth

prosecuting
v.

Gilman,

attorney
368

A2d

has
253

been
(Pa.

aptly
1977)

described
wherein

The
in
the

Pennsylvania high court stated:

11

[T]he
prosecutor
is
a
quasi-judicial
officer
representing the Commonwealth.
His duty is to seek
justice, not just convictions . . ."
"Although
the prosecutor operates within
the
adversary system, it is fundamental that his obligation
is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the
guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to
enforce the rights of the public."
During closing argument, the prosecution has an obligation to:

11

. . . present facts so that the jury can dispassionately and objectively evaluate the testimony in a
sober and reflective frame of mind that will produce a
judgment warranted by the evidence and not inspired by

emotion or passion.
The prosecutor's position as both an administrator of
justice and an advocate "gives him a responsibility not
to be vindictive or attempt in any manner to influence
the jury by arousing their prejudices." In particular,
the prosecutor must limit his argument to the facts in
evidence and legitimate inferences therefrom,"
(at 257 citations omitted).
The Box Elder County Attorney's statements were brought to the
attention of the trial judge by way of the Motion for New Trial.
The error of which Appellant complained to the Trial Court was that
the prosecutor repeatedly suggested

to the jury that Appellant

conspired to fabricate the story of self-defense.

There was never

any evidence adduced that a jury could reasonably

infer Ray

Cabututan conspired to commit perjury or the self-defense claim.
The Appellant asserts that the Trial Courts denial of the motion
for

new

trial

constituted

an

abuse

of

discretion

and

the

prosecutors remarks constituted plain error.
An abuse of discretion occurs when, taking into account any
remedial measures ordered by the Trial Court, the prejudice to the
defendant still satisfies the standard for reversible error set
forth in Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 30. Errors and defects.

The

remedial measure of a new trial was requested, but refused.

C.

FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE WEAPON FOR THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

Appellant claims that there should have been no conviction on
the charge of aggravated assault because the sharpening stone was
not produced so as to give the jury the opportunity to determine if
the

weapon

was

in

fact

a

deadly

information.
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weapon

as

stated

in

the

D

*

VOUCHING FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS

Finally, the prosecution committed plain error in vouching for
the credibility of Richard Anderson.

[T 746]

Ludwig,

Cri.

508,

interjecting
Richard

F. 2d
his

140,

143

personal

Anderson having

(10th

opinions

no reason

on

See United States v

1974),
such

to lie.

and

otherwise

matters

regarding

[T 784, 787]

It was

prejudicial error for the Box Elder County Attorney to inject his
personal opinion regarding Richard Anderson's credibility, thereby
clearly and improperly intruding upon the jury's exclusive function
of evaluating

the credibility of witnesses.

without the Court immediately

In such a case,

intervening and taking

curative

action in regard to the Box Elder County Attorney vouching for the
credibility of a witness, a jury has no choice but to give such
statements full credibility, since

they came by and

through the

power and prestige of the office of the Box Elder County Attorney.
See Gilman, 368 A.2d at 258-59.

As previously noted, it has been

firmly established by case law that a prosecutor may not express
his personal opinion regarding a defendant's guilt, credibility or
trial strategy.

Id. at 258.

However, it was done so in this matter and was

an error that

the Court allowed to the detriment of the Defendant inasmuch as the
conflicting nature of the State's witnesses (Tilley and Anderson on
the ability to see and the open door).

Such a departure from the

standards

of

mandates

that

the

decision

reversed.
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the

Trial

Court

be

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE CONSTITUTED A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND A VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The First Judicial District Court committed reversible error
by denying the Appellant's Motion for continuance of the trial date
set (p. 150).

While the granting of a continuance is within the

sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion, an abuse may be found
where a party has made timely objections, given necessary notice
and made a reasonable effort to have the trial date reset for good
cause, as occurred in this criminal case.
P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982).

State v Creviston, 646

The denial of a motion for continuance

may also constitute reversible error on the grounds that the denial
effectively

obviated

Defendant's

United

States

Constitutional

guarantee to effective assistance of counsel whereby counsel lacks
sufficient time to prepare his defense.

See Hintz v Beto, 379 F.2d

937, 942 (5th Cir. 1967) Among other things, the lawyer was denied
the opportunity to review and analyze the self-defense argument;
review the claim of capacity; analyze the separate nature of the
trials and its affect on Defendant's claim of self-defense.
On January 3, 1990, the Trial Court scheduled the trial for
January 22, 1990, through January 26, 1990, over the strong oral
objections of Appellant's counsel.
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In denying the Motion For

Continuance for Trial Date, the Trial Court failed to inquire as to
the amount of time that Appellant's counsel deemed
prepare

for

trial, or

to schedule

a pretrial

necessary to

conference, as

provided for by Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to
address preparation
also

and other relevant trial

issues.

The Court

failed to schedule a pretrial conference as required by the

Court's

own

rules.

(See Appendix, attached

to this

brief.)

Shortly thereafter, on January 10, 1990, Appellant filed with the
Trial Court a written Motion for Continuance of the Trial Date. [R.
142].

Among the numerous grounds stated for a continuance of the

trial date cited in Appellant's Motion, was the pertinent fact that
Appellant's counsel had not yet received a copy of the 949 pages of
transcript of the Preliminary Hearing for counsel examination.

In

addition to the necessity of reviewing the voluminous Preliminary
Hearing

transcript, Appellant's

counsel, during

the

short

time

remaining prior to trial, was faced with the following preparatory
trial responsibilities that required sufficient attorney time for:
(1)
ordinary

the need to review and carefully analyze the extra-

amounts of physical, documentary, and expert

evidence,

including the statements of various witnesses;
(2)
but

also

generated

by

the need to review and analyze, not only by counsel,
experts

assisting

by the State's medical

counsel,
examiner

documentary
and

evidence

forensic

blood

expert, which the prosecution had agreed to provide to Appellant's
counsel at the Preliminary Hearing, but which Appellant's counsel
had not received as of the date of the Motion for Continuance on
January 10, 1990;
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(3)

interview

potential

witnesses,

including

Pat

Bentzley and Darrell Green, the Appellant's boss and a supervisor
at Western

Brine

Shrimp

Company, who

each, according

to the

Appellant, at least would have testified that Appellant was a good
worker and would otherwise provide good character testimony;

(4)

the need to consult with and prepare the trial

testimony Dr. Finkle, the Court appointed toxicologist expert, on
the effects of alcohol on an individual who had consumed as much
alcohol as the Appellant had on the night of October 25, 1989;
(5)

the need to obtain accurate photographic evidence of

the crime scene that would depict the lines of sight of the various
State witnesses, and the dimness of the lighting from the trailer
houses at night; and
(6)

additionally, the need to consult with a psychiatric

expert on the Appellant's ability to form the requisite intent for
the charged crime of Second Degree Murder.
imposed

by the Trial

Court

in denying

The time constraints

Appellant's Motion For a

Continuance of Trial Date adversely impaired the Appellant's United
States Constitutional and Constitution of Utah guarantee to effective assistance of counsel and to a fair trial, at least in the
following:
Appellant's counsel did not have sufficient time to
review, in any depth, the Preliminary Hearing transcripts or the
written

statements

witnesses.

and

transcribed

interviews

of

various

key

Clearly, reversible error was committed as a result of

the Court in denying Appellant's Motion to Continue the trial date
to

allow

defense

counsel

to

adequately
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prepare

for

trial,

especially where the charges made were so grave.

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
states in part:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy
the
right...to
have
compulsory
process
for
obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense."
The standard of review applied to cases where the
assistance of counsel is challenged has been established
by the United States Supreme Court.
The Court has
stated,
"To succeed on a claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel requires a showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel'
guaranteed
the
Defendant
by
the
Sixth
Amendment and that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267
(1984), 80 L.Ed.2d 674; see also State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 219
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d

401 (Utah, 1986).

And further, in order to show prejudice to his case, Defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the
confidence of the outcome.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 649, see also

Morehouse, 748 P.2d at 219; State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1023
(Utah, 1987); State v. Wynia, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 16.
Defendant claims that errors were committed at trial due to
the Court's failure to allow adequate time to prepare for trial [R.
352-356].

Those errors were as follows:
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Failure to:
(1)

adequately cross-examine witnesses;

(2)

object to Jury panel or insure that minorities were
on panel;

(3)

determine whether to separate or join trials with
Co-Defendants [Jan, 18 T 80 - 81];

(4)

investigate alcohol/intent claims by a psychiatrist;

(5)

adequately prepare the self-defense argument.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
On March 2, 1990, Appellant filed a Motion For A New Trial
based

upon

14

separate

arguments

of

misconduct,

abuse

of

discretion, and new testimony that was formally unavailable to the
Defendant [R. 348-351].

In support of the Motion, the Defendant,

himself, filed an Affidavit [R. 352-356].
After consideration of the oral arguments, the Trial Court
denied the Motion For A New Trial [R. 368]. Appellant claims that
new evidence, formally unavailable to be presented, now existed
which would exculpate the Defendant.
It is a rule that newly discovered evidence which merely seeks
to impeach prosecution witnesses does not ordinarily warrant a new
trial.

But, the District Court held in U.S. v. Atkinson (D.C. N.Y.

1977) 492 F Sup. 880, that in some circumstances it is sufficiently
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important so that a new trial should be ordered.
On

a Motion

challenged

For A New Trial, the Court must

trial proceedings

process have been met.

review

the

to ensure that the dictates of due

It is the obligation of the Court to ensure

that fundamental fairness has been provided.

U.S. v. Narciso (D.C.

Mich. 1977) 446 F Sup 252.
The issue is the integrity of the judicial process.

The Court

could not have made a full determination of findings without having
heard the evidence.

It refused to hear the evidence.

This was a

mistake, and in and of itself constituted an abuse of discretion.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Harris (Utah
1973) 513 Pac. 2d 438, 439, 440:

"The denial of (a Motion For A New Trial on the
Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence) will be deemed an
abuse of discretion...where there is a grave suspicion
that justice may have been miscarried because of the
lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which new
evidence will supply..."
The Jury never heard the evidence sought to be presented by
the defense on the Motion For A New Trial.
the evidence.

The Judge never heard

Neither the Judge nor the Jury, therefore, was able

to be enlightened on a vital point.
Appellant

claims that the trials of the other

Defendants

produced testimony that he, himself, had been the one:
(1) to hit Rameriz;
(2) was the only one outside when it happened, and
(3) that he was not seen later.
At trial, Defendant sought to have the three (3) Co-Defendants
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testify.

However, each of them, facing their own trial, refused to

testify by invoking their Fifth Amendment rights.
However, after trial, their testimony, which was not contradictory but exculpatory to the Appellant was available by way of
transcript.
Defendant, having tried to present at trial this testimony,
which only became available to him after the trial of the other
three (3) Co-Defendants, should now be allowed to use the same.
It should be noted that each of the Co-Defendants had the
opportunity to use Appellant's testimony (and at least 2 did so).

POINT V
APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE
THE JURY, COURT AND CRIMINAL SYSTEM
WAS PREJUDICIAL TOWARDS HIM
Counsel submits the argument, pursuant to Defendant's wishes,
and under the Rules pursuant to Anders v California, 386 U.S. 738,
87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed. 2d 443 (1967) that Defendant was denied a
fair trial due to biased opinions against him based upon his race.
In support of this position, Defendant maintains that:
A.

Defendant was not tried by a jury of his peers because

there were no minorities on either the jury or jury panel.
B.

The Court

thought

the Defendant

was a Hispanic

rather

than American-Filipino [R 64].
C.

Someone on the jury panel stated that the Defendant was

Mexican, obviously
seated

calling

near him that the

to that person's

attention and those

Defendant was a minority.

Motion for New Trial, March 23, T 10]

[Hearing on

D.

The conservative

history of Box

Elder

County

was such

that no minority could receive a fair trial, as evidenced by the
fact that after for days of testimony, the jury took less than two
hours to decide 3 counts

[March 23, T 10] and found the Defendant

guilty on the charges.
E.

The Court refused

to allow the Defendant to call the

three Co-Defendants, even though they may have only exercised their
Fifth Amendment right to not provide self-incrimination.

[Jan. 18,

T 76 - 80]

POINT VI
THE NUMEROUS SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS COMMITTED
AMOUNT TO CUMULATIVE ERROR
Even assuming that none of the foregoing substantial errors,
in and of themselves constituted

reversible error, the cumulative

impact of each error prejudiced Appellant's right to a fair trial
thus constituting reversible error.
498, 501-02 (Utah, 1986).

See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d

Confidence in the verdict is undermined,

at least to the extent that, in the absence of the cumulative
errors, a reasonable probability exists that even if the jury
disregarded

the claim

of

self-defense, the Appellant would

have

been convicted of one of the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter or negligent homicide due to his voluntary
and

lack

of formation

Degree Murder.

of the requisite

intent

to commit

Under such circumstances, reversal
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intoxication
Second

is warranted.

See State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah, 1989).
In Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okla. Crim. App• 1980),
the Court announced a similar test:

"[W]hen a review of the entire record reveals
numerous irregularities that tend to prejudice the
rights of a defendant and where an accumulation of
errors denies a defendant a fair trial, the case
will be reversed, even though one of the errors,
standing alone, would not be ample to justify
reversal."
Such is the case now before the Court.

Throughout the entire

process, the cumulative weight of the errors committed required a
reversal and at the least a remand to the Trial Court for a new
trial.

CONCLUSION

Appellant submits that the appropriate remedy is for this
Court to reverse his conviction and grant Appellant a new trial
because of the numerous substantial and prejudicial errors which
are apparent on the face of the record which undermine confidence
in the verdict.
Respectfully submitted this |£

day of February, 1991.

w
Quinn D. Hunsaker
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct
copies of Appellant's Brief on Appeal to: R. Paul Van Dam,
Attorney General, 236 State Capital Building, Salt Lake City, UT
84114.
DATED this \1

day of

M™

1991.

hi
Attorney

Appendix
Local Rules of the First Judicial District Court

b. Continuances will be recorded in the file to
give the court information on continuances. Who
requested, reason, etc.

CRIMINAL CASE MANAGEMENT:
1.

FILING OF CRIMINAL CHARGE
a. When an appeal or a case is bound over from
the Circuit Court the matter will be placed on
the next Law and Motion calendar for arraignment,
b. At the time of arraignment and if the
Defendant wants to enter a "NOT GUILTY" plea, the
court will then give the Defendant's Counsel and
the County Attorney's office two weeks to see if
a negotiation is possible. (Negotiation time
will depend on type of case and discovery time)
After the time allowed for negotiations the
defendant and his/her counsel must appear before
the court either to change the plea, dismiss the
case or to set a trial date. At that time a
trial setting will be given in court to the
defendant and counsel.
c. If a settlement cannot be reached through the
plea negotiations and a trial date is set by the
court, it will:
1.
2.
3.

Go to trial on the original charge.
No plea negotiations will be
accepted by the court.
The defendant can enter a plea of
guilty to the original charge.

